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Abstract. We provide an example of an outcome game form with
two players for which there is in an open set of utilities for both
players such that, in each of the associated games, the set of Nash
equilibria induces a continuum of outcome distributions.
1. Introduction
Harsanyi [4] shows that, generically in the space of utilities, a ﬁnite
normal form game has a ﬁnite (and odd) number of mixed equilibria.
Kreps and Wilson [5] note that when the normal form is derived from
an extensive form, Harsanyi’s result has no immediate implications,
because many strategies lead to the same ﬁnal node. Even if the payoﬀs
at the ﬁnal nodes can be perturbed independently, the ﬁniteness of
the number of equilibria need not be a generic property; appropriate
counterexamples are easy to construct. Thus, Harsanyi’s result cannot
be applied directly to many economic models of interest.
For games in extensive form, Kreps and Wilson [5] prove that for
generic utility payoﬀs on the terminal nodes, the Nash equilibria in-
duce ﬁnitely many probability distributions on the same set of termi-
nal nodes. Based on techniques from the theory of semi-algebraic sets,
Govindan and McLennan, [3] provide a more direct proof of the results
above, for normal as well as for extensive form games.
On the other hand, Mas-Colell [7] and later Govindan and McLen-
nan [3] point out that, in many economic instances, diﬀerent strategy
proﬁles generate the same outcome; moreover, this may be true for dif-
ferent terminal nodes of an extensive game. Thus, the same criticism
can be reiterated for the Kreps and Wilson [5] result.
A suitable general setup to address the above problem is obtained
with the notion of an outcome game form, i.e., a mapping from strat-
egy proﬁles to outcomes. We can now pose the question as follows:
assuming that the utility functions on outcomes may be independently
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perturbed, is it true that, generically, the equilibrium strategies of the
associated game induce a ﬁnite number of probability distributions on
the set of outcomes?
When there are at least three players, Govindan and McLennan [3]
provide a negative answer to the above question. They show an exam-
ple of a game form with six outcomes where, for an open set of utility
functions, the Nash equilibria induce a continuum of outcome distribu-
tions. On the positive side and for games with any number of players,
Govindan and McLennan [3] prove that if there are only two outcomes,
generic ﬁniteness on equilibrium outcome distributions is restored.
So far, for two person game forms, partial evidence had been obtained
that suggested a possible positive answer to the question above. Mas-
Colell [7] shows that the equilibrium payoﬀs are generically ﬁnite for
two player game forms. Govindan and McLennan [2] prove the generic
ﬁniteness of equilibrium distributions on outcomes for zero sum games
and common interest games. Gonza´lez-Pimienta [1] argues that the
same result holds for games with two players and three outcomes.
This note closes the last remaining gap in the case of two players,
in a rather unexpected way. We provide an example of a game form
(with four outcomes) and an open set of utility functions such that in
each of the associated games there is a continuum of outcome distri-
butions induced by Nash equilibria. By introducing dummy players,
our example can be extended, in an obvious way, to any number of
players and four outcomes. The results in Gonza´lez-Pimienta [1] and
Govindan and McLennan [3] show that this is the minimum number of
outcomes needed for a counterexample.
2. The conjecture
Let Ω be a ﬁnite outcome space and let S1, S2 denote the ﬁnite
strategy spaces of each of the two players. An outcome game form is
a mapping θ : S1 × S2 → Ω. The utilities of the players are deﬁned by
the functions ui : Ω → R, i = 1, 2.
For each i = 1, 2, let Δi = {μ ∈ RSi++ :
∑
x∈Si μ(x) = 1}. A pair of
strategy vectors pi ∈ Δi of the players induces a probability distribution
in Ω.
An outcome game form θ and the utilities of the players ui, i =
1, 2 determine a bimatrix game. We denote by A(ui) the associated
matrices of utilities of the players in this game. That is, the entry ajl
of A(ui) is ui(θ(sj, sl)).
A completely mixed Nash equilibrium in this game consists of two
strategy vectors p1 ∈ Δ1 and p2 ∈ Δ2 such that
A(u2) p1 = β e for some β ∈ R.
p2 A(u1) = α e for some α ∈ R.
where e denotes the vector (in the appropriate Euclidean space) with
all of its entries equal to 1.
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Conjecture 1. For every bimatrix game form θ, there is a generic set
of utilities in RΩ × RΩ for which the set of distributions induced on
outcomes by the completely mixed Nash equilibria is ﬁnite.
For the case of two person games, this conjecture corresponds to
Conjecture T in Govindan and McLennan [3]. They disprove the con-
jecture for games with at least three players.
3. The example
We now give an example that shows that Conjecture 1 does not hold.
Let there be four outcomes, denoted by Ω = {a, b, c, d}. And consider
the outcome matrix
A(a, b, c, d) =
(
c a b b
d a a b
c d b c
)
Let us use the notation ai = ui(a), bi = ui(b), ci = ui(c), di = ui(d),
and ui = (ai, bi, ci, di) ∈ R4 for the utilities of agent i = 1, 2. We denote
G = {(u1, u2) ∈ R8 | d1, b1 < a1, c1 and d2 < b2 < a2, c2}, an open
subset in the space of utilities. For each (u1, u2) ∈ G and t ∈ R, we
deﬁne
p1(u
2) =
1
a2 − b2 + c2 − d2 (b2 − d2, c2 − b2, a2 − b2) ∈ R
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and
p2(u
1; t) =
( a1 − b1
a1 − b1 + c1 − d1 −
(a1 − b1)t
a1 − d1 ,
(c1 − d1)t
a1 − d1 ,
c1 − d1
a1 − b1 + c1 − d1 −
(c1 − d1)t
a1 − d1 , t
)
∈ R4.
One checks immediately that the pair 〈p1(u2), p2(u1; t)〉 is a completely
mixed Nash equilibrium provided t is positive and small enough. The
probability of outcome a induced by the equilibrium is computed easily
as
pa =
(b2 − c2)(c1 − d1)
(a1 − b1 + c1 − d1)(−a2 + b2 − c2 + d2)
+
b2(d1 − c1) + b1(c2 − d2) + c1d2 − c2d1
(a1 − d1)(−a2 + b2 − c2 + d2) t
Therefore, there is a continuum of equilibrium probability distributions
(i.e. for t positive and small enough) on the set of outcomes as long
as (u1, u2) ∈ G and b2(d1 − c1) + b1(c2 − d2) + c1d2 − c2d1 = 0; such
values of u1 and u2 form an open subset in the space of utilities. Re-
mark that when u1 = ±u2, the coeﬃcient of t in the above expression
for pa (as well as for the other outcomes) disappears and there is a
unique probability distribution on outcomes, as proved in Govindan
and McLennan [2] and Litan [6].
3
References
1. C. Gonza´lez-Pimienta, Generic ﬁniteness of outcome distributions for two person
game forms with three outcomes, Mimeo, University Carlos III (2007).
2. S. Govindan and A. McLennan, Generic ﬁniteness of outcome distributions for
two person game forms with zero sum and common interest utilities, Mimeo,
University of Western Ontario (1998).
3. , On the generic ﬁniteness of equilibrium outcome distributions in game
forms, Econometrica 69 (2001), 455–471.
4. J.C. Harsanyi, Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof, Inter-
national Journal of Game Theory 2 (1973), 235–250.
5. D.M. Kreps and R. Wilson, Sequential equilibria, Econometrica 50 (1982), 863–
894.
6. C. M. Litan, On the generic determinancy in bimatrix game forms, Mimeo,
University Carlos III (2007).
7. A. Mas-Colell, Generic ﬁniteness of equilibrium payoﬀs for bimatrix games,
Mimeo, Harvard University (1994).
Russian Academy of Sciences, Dorodnicyn Computing Center, Moscow.
E-mail address: ququns@pochta.ru
University Carlos III de Madrid, Department of Economics, Madrid.
E-mail address: clitan@eco.uc3m.es
University Carlos III de Madrid, Department of Economics, Madrid.
E-mail address: marhuend@eco.uc3m.es
4
